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Bahr v. Regan, 6 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2021)
Aspen B. Ward
I. INTRODUCTION
Bahr v. Regan1 is the most recent challenge to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Exceptional Events Rule
(“EER”) and highlights the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) shortcomings in
addressing wildfire smoke pollution.
Between June 17, 2015 to June 21, 2015 the Lake Fire consumed
roughly 29,813 acres of California’s San Bernardino National Forest.2
Three days later, in Phoenix, Arizona, three hundred miles east of the fire,
six air quality monitors registered abnormally high concentrations of
ozone that exceeded the standards under the National Ambient Air Quality
Standard (“NAAQS”).3 Phoenix had long been out of attainment with
ozone NAAQS and faced a July 2018 deadline to demonstrate attainment.4
The EPA determined Phoenix had successfully attained the ozone
NAAQS by the deadline, but only after using the EER to exclude the June
2015 readings.5 This meant Arizona avoided additional and stricter
regulatory burdens, including a need to develop contingency measures for
failing to attain the NAAQS by the deadline.6
A group of Phoenix citizens (“Petitioners”) sought review of the
EPA’s final decision to exclude the June 2015 exceedances under the EER.
The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review, determining the EPA’s
findings and conclusion that Arizona “achieved the statutory required
reduction in ozone concentration by July 2018” complied with the CAA.7
This case illustrates the misalignment between public health, air quality,
and wildfire smoke associated with the EPA’s EER.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wildfire smoke pollution has become a pervasive public health
threat with few regulatory solutions.8 Scientists assert growing frequency
and intensity of wildfires is largely attributable to symptoms of climate

1.
6 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2021).
2.
Bill Gabbert, Lake Fire, east of San Bernardino, California,
WILDFIRE TODAY, June 18, 2015, https://perma.cc/7RYZ-RN26.
3.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1063.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id. at 1059.
8.
Jennifer Hijazi, Wildfires Highlight What’s ‘Gone Wrong’ in
Pollution Mitigation, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZH3G5DJN.
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change such as prolonged drought and periods of excessive heat.9 Fine
particulate matter released by wildfires can be dangerous to human health
when breathed at high concentrations.10
The Lake Fire started on June 17, 2015 and burned a section of
the San Bernardino National Forest roughly the size of San Francisco.11
Smoke billowing off the Southern California fire caused hazy skies in
Arizona but did not incite a health advisory from the Arizona Department
of Environmental Quality (“ADEQ”).12 Prior to the Lake Fire, the EPA
classified the nonattainment status of the Phoenix area as “moderate” and
issued a revised attainment date of July 20, 2018.13
On June 20, 2015, six Phoenix ozone monitors in that nonattainment
region recorded 0.075ppm,14 exceeding the 2008 ozone NAAQS.15 The
ADEQ notified the EPA in July 2016 they would seek to exclude these six
exceedances under the EER. The EPA formally accepted ADEQ’s request
and excluded those readings.16 The EER requires the EPA to exclude
monitoring data if the exceedance was clearly caused by exceptional,
uncontrollable events.17 The EPA revised the EER in October 2016,
replacing the 2007 version.18 In 2020, Sandra Bahr and two co-plaintiffs
challenged the EPA’s final rule excluding the exceedances, alleging the
retroactive application of the 2016 EER to a 2015 wildfire event was
improper.19
III. CLEAN AIR ACT
The CAA’s general purpose is to promote public health and
welfare through protections and enhancements to the United States’ air.20
To effectuate this purpose, the CAA authorizes comprehensive federal and
state regulations to limit emissions from stationary and mobile sources.21
9.
Peter Szekely & Steve Gorman, Western wildfire smoke causes
cross-country air pollution, REUTERS (Jul. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/KBM2-CNNV.
10.
Nadja Popovich & Josh Katz, See How Wildfire Smoke Spread
Across America, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/5JHA-6HR6.
11.
Haeyoun Park, Damien Cave, & Wilson Andrews, After Years of
Drought, Wildfires Rage in California, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015),
https://perma.cc/68QA-TYDQ.
12.
Brian Rinker, California fire sends haze towards Grand Canyon,
Arizona, AZ CENTRAL (Jun. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/2FKH-Q4NN.
13.
Bahr, 6 F.4th 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2021).
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 1059.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 1064; see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2018) (petitions for review
for final action of the Administrator under the CAA which is “locally or regionally
applicable” must be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
appropriate Circuit).
20.
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).
21.
Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/5MGP-YKFZ (last visited Aug. 3, 2021).
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This is a goal-driven statute enacted for pollution prevention through
federal, state, and local governmental administration.22
Despite this structure, the CAA operates predominantly through
state action, not direct federal control.23 NAAQS and State
Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) are two of the most important regulatory
devices the CAA uses to address air pollution. These fall under the
directive of the EPA, directly and indirectly through their setting and
revising regional NAAQS and reviewing SIPs.24 Further, the CAA
provides liberal use for wildfire smoke as an exceptional event.25
An objection to a rule or procedure under the CAA must be “raised
with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment may be
raised during judicial review.”26 This is a threshold questions for the court
to determine if a petitioner fulfilled the requirement to provide the agency
sufficient notice so they may rectify the alleged violation that falls under
the CAA.27
A. NAAQS and SIPs
The NAAQS program requires the EPA to set limits on the
atmospheric concentrations of six principal pollutants.28 The EPA set the
ozone standard under NAAQS at 0.075ppm.29 Areas that do not meet the
standards set under the NAAQS are identified by the EPA as
“nonattainment areas.”30 A region attains NAAQS if each monitoring
station in the nonattainment area has a “3-year calculated value at or below
0.075ppm”.31 The manner in which the EPA has designed monitoring site
compliance with NAAQS can lead to a single monitoring site to
significantly impact the entire region’s attainment of NAAQS.32 The EPA
addresses wildfire emissions primarily through these specific air pollutant
standards.33

22.
Emily Williams, Comment, Reimagining Exceptional Events:
Regulating Wildfires Through the Clean Air Act, 96 WASH. L. REV. 765, 77-778
(2021).
23.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1065.
24.
40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–50.12 (2020).
25.
Williams, supra note 26, at 768.
26.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2018).
27.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1070.
28.
40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1–50.19; see also NAAQS Table, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/YCN4-YNRC (describes
“criteria” air pollutants as primary and secondary standards with the average time and
levels not to be exceeded).
29.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1066.
30.
Id. at 1064.
31.
Id. at 1066.
32.
Id. at 1066 n.6.
33.
Bryan C. Williamson, Screaming “Wildfire” in a Crowded Clean
Air Act, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (Aug. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/CYH6-N8P8.
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SIPs are state-developed technical reports that show how a state is
in compliance or will reach compliance with NAAQS.34 Though states
create SIPs, the EPA plays an important role by collaborating with a state’s
environmental quality agency to develop a SIP Further, the EPA must
review and approve or disapprove each element within the SIP and ensure
the opportunity for public comment.35
Through an agency memorandum later codified in regulation,36
the EPA established a “Clean Data Policy” that functions as the agency’s
interpretation of the SIP requirements.37 The Clean Data Policy allows the
EPA to suspend certain SIPs obligations for nonattainment areas while the
area is actively attaining NAAQS ozone requirements, but before the area
is redesignated formally.38 However, the SIPs requirements are only
suspended “as long as the nonattainment area continues to monitor
attainments of the standard.”39
B. EPA’s Exceptional Event Rule
Under the EER, when the EPA makes an attainment
determination, it must exclude any exceedances where the air quality was
influenced by an “exceptional event”.40 For an event to qualify as
exceptional it must be caused by human activity that is unlikely to recur
as a particular natural event.41 It must also be considered not reasonably
controllable or preventable.42 Further, to warrant exclusion as an
exceptional event there must be a “clear causal relationship” between the
NAAQS exceedance and the specified event.43 This requires a
demonstration that the proposed event caused the specific air pollution
concentration at the particular monitoring locations which experienced an
exceedance.44 The EER specifically excludes stagnation of air masses,
meteorological inversions or events involving high temperature or lack of
precipitation, or air pollution due to source noncompliance.45
Wildfires that cause ozone exceedances are often designated as
exceptional events.46 This permits the air pollution created from these

34.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)–(j) (2018).
35.
Id. § 7427.
36.
Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality
Planning Standards (May 10, 1995) at 1 [hereinafter Seitz Memo]; 40 C.F.R. § 51.118
(2020).
37.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1065–66.
38.
Id. at 1065–1066; see 40 C.F.R. § 51.118; 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b), (c).
39.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1066; see Seitz Memo, supra note 36, at 4; 40
C.F.R. § 51.1118.
40.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1066 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b) (2018)).
41.
42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).
42.
Id. § 7619(b)(1)(A)(ii).
43.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1066–67.
44.
42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(3)(B)(ii).
45.
Id. § 7619(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii).
46.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1067.
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events to be excluded from state efforts to meet air quality standards.47 The
EPA replaced the 2007 EER with a revised 2016 version revising the state
demonstration requirements.48 This new rule took away the “in excess of
normal historical fluctuations” and “but for the event” standards and
imported new demonstration standards.49
The EPA finalized revisions to the EER in October 2016.50 The
previous version, from 2007, required a state to prove, among other things,
exceedances were outside historical fluctuations and caused by a “but for”
event.51 The 2016 EER revisions took these standards out and imported
new standards for a successful demonstration by the state.52
To exclude data in air quality measurements, the state must
request that the EPA flag measurements it may want to exclude at a later
date.53 The state must prove wildfire emissions were: “(1) transported to
monitor; (2) affected the monitor; and (3) caused the ozone
exceedances”.54
i. Presumption Against Retroactivity
The presumption against retroactivity generally prevents
interpreting statutes and regulations to apply to events occurring prior to
their effective date.55 The Supreme Court established a two-step approach
to evaluate when the presumption against retroactivity does not apply in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products.56 Under Landgraf, it must be determined
whether “‘Congress has expressly prescribed’ that a regulation is to be
retroactively applied”57 and “whether application of the regulation would
have retroactive effect.”58 Presumption against retroactivity exists where
the retroactive application of statues and rules impairs “prior-existing
rights and . . . affect[s] reliance interests.”59

47.
Hijazi, supra note 8.
48.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1067.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 1067.
52.
Id.
53.
Kirsten H. Engel, Perverse Incentives: The Case of Wildfire Smoke
Regulation, 40 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 623, 649 (2013).
54.
Bahr, at 1067–68 (This standard of proof is known as a Tier 3
demonstration under EPA guidance documents and is used for complex causation
relationships between wildfire and ozone. More straightforward instances require less
documentation and proof under Tier 1 or Tier 2.).
55.
Id. at 1069.
56.
511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
57.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1072 (citing Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d
935, 939 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)).
58.
Id. (citing Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2007)).
59.
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 270
(1994)).
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IV. DECISION
The Ninth Circuit ruled the EPA complied with the CAA.60 Under the
APA, courts set aside agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”61 The court
found Petitioners failed to bring their objections in a timely manner and
did not exhaust administrative remedies.62 Further, the court held the
EPA’s exclusion of the June 2015 exceedances under the 2016 EER was
permissible under the CAA framework. Accordingly, the court denied the
petition for review.63
A. Retroactive Application of the 2016 Version of the EER was Proper
The court determined the EPA did not violate the presumption
against retroactivity by applying the 2016 EER to a 2015 wildfire.64 The
court reasoned the rule did not have a prohibitive retroactive effect because
the use of the 2016 version in lieu of the 2007 version did not impair
“vested rights, create new obligations, or otherwise impact any interests in
fair notice, reasonable reliance, or settled expectations.”65 The court
considered whether Petitioners exhausted administrative remedies on the
issue before evaluating the argument’s merits.66
1. Petitioners Did Not Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The court reviewed the administrative remedies provided by the
CAA and determined Petitioners had not exhausted those remedies.67 The
court noted the CAA allows objections to rules or procedures to be
justiciable if raised “with reasonable specificity during the period for
public comment.”68 Though the court acknowledged a procedural
exhaustion requirement should be broad in its interpretation, it may only
considers issues sufficiently and clearly expressed to the decision-making
agency to understand and rule on the issue raised.69 In short, an objection
to an agency’s action must be sufficiently clear to put the agency on notice.
Petitioners acknowledged the likely absence of sufficient clarity as their
comment implicitly contested the EPA’s decision but failed to explicitly
60.
Sebastian Malo, 9th Circ. denies challenge to EPA approval of
Arizona ozone levels, REUTERS July 28, 2021, https://perma.cc/Z7GX-BN9V.
61.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1069 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
62.
Id. at 1085.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 1074.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 1071.
67.
Id. at 1070.
68.
Id. at 1069–70 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2018)
regarding petition for judicial review of administerial action promulgating any
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard).
69.
Id. at 1070.

2021

Bahr v. Regan

7

do so. Petitioners’ comment addressed one requirement unique to the 2007
rule: a failure to show exceedances were “in excess of historical
fluctuations” by the ADEQ.70 Further, they claimed their comment
critiqued the analysis ADEQ used to demonstrate the “but for”
requirement.71 However, because Petitioners themselves did not discuss
this explicitly, the court found the EPA would be challenged to interpret
this criticism as a suggestion the governing rule should be the 2007 version
rather than the 2016.72 The court found Petitioners’ comments, on their
face, to be an observance of exceedance and not a clearly stated argument
regarding failures of the 2007 “in excess of historical fluctuations”
exceedance requirement.73 The court held Petitioners failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies regarding application of the 2007 or 2016
EER.74
2. Applying the 2016 Exceptional Events Rule Does Not Violate a
Presumption Against Retroactivity
Even if Petitioners had satisfied the necessary administrative
procedures, the court nonetheless found the application of the 2016 EER
did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect.75 There is no dispute that
six air quality monitors in Phoenix recorded exceedances of the ozone
pollution standard of 0.075 parts per million on June 20, 2015.76 Here,
Petitioners asserted the 2007 EER should have applied to the Lake Fire
exceedances. This claim rested on the presumption against retroactivity,
which generally prevents applying statutes and regulation to events having
occurred prior to their effective date.77 However, this presumption exists
only where application of those statues and rules has a retroactive effect
“impairing prior-existing rights and . . . affecting reliance interests.”78
Therefore, the EPA’s application of the 2016 EER in lieu of the 2007 rule
is valid only if it there is no impact on Petitioners’ vested rights and did
not effect a regulated party’s interest for notice, reasonable reliance, or a
settled expectations.79
The court used the approach set forth in Landgraf to determine the
presumption against retroactivity did not apply.80 For the first step, neither
party contended the EPA possesses expressed retroactive authority as

70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 1070 n.11.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 1070.
74.
Id. at 1071.
75.
Id.
76.
Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 31, Bahr v. Regan, 6 F.4th 1059 (9th
Cir. 2020) (No. 20-70092), ECF No. 13.
77.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1069.
78.
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 270,
(1994)).
79.
Id. at 1071.
80.
Id. at 1072.
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applied to exceptional events.81 For the second step in the Landgraf
analysis, the court looked to the timing of the exceedances to determine if
any vested rights under the CAA were impaired by the EPA’s application
of the 2016 EER rather than the 2007 version.82 The court held Petitioners’
interest was not in the “application of any particular rule on any particular
date,” but rather in the “accurate and faithful enforcement” according to
best scientific judgement.83 Petitioners offered no evidence contradicting
the revised rule as a “valid and faithful endeavor by the EPA to implement
the Clean Air Act,” and rather than impairing Petitioners’ interests, those
interests were better served under the revised rule.84
With no complaint from the ADEQ and no demonstration from
Petitioners that the EPA’s application of the 2016 EER retroactively
impaired any vested rights or other concerns, the court held the retroactive
application the EPA was permissible.85
B. A Clear Causal Relationship Existed Between California’s Lake Fire
and the June 20 Exceedances in Phoenix
The court upheld the EPA’s finding that a clear causal relationship
existed between the 2015 Lake Fire and the measured exceedances in
Phoenix.86 The EPA’s findings on this relationship were reviewed under
the APA’s “arbitrary or capricious” standard.87 Because the review
consisted primarily of factual issues, the court deferred to the agency’s
technical expertise. 88 The EPA reviewed ADEQ’s petition to exclude data
and determined whether ADEQ adequately demonstrated a clear causal
relationship that the Lake Fire smoke emissions were “(1) transported to
the six monitors; (2) affected the monitors; and (3) caused the ozone
exceedances.”89 The court determined a rational connection existed
between the evidence relied upon by the EPA and their conclusions
regarding these three requirements.90 Petitioners provided no supporting
technical models for their comment to the EPA, rather they argued the
evidence relied upon by the EPA failed to support a clear causal
relationship.91 The court found little merit in several of Petitioners’
arguments.92
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 1073.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 1074.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 1075.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. (A petition to exclude is a request from state air pollution
officials for the EPA to review a demonstration seeking to exclude data from
monitoring sites where there was an exceedance preventing compliance with NAAQS
standards.).
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 1076 n.17.
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First, Petitioners argued against evidence that the smoke
emissions were transported to the six monitors. They primarily disagreed
with the following submissions of the ADEQ: (1) satellite images and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration smoke maps
illustrating smoke plumage trajectories of the Lake Fire; and (2)
geographic pattern of heightened ozone concentrations for Arizona on
June 19 and 20.93 The court relied on the EPA’s expertise, particularly as
Petitioners failed to show the absence of a rational connection between
ADEQ’s factual demonstrations and the EPA’s conclusion that smoke
from the Lake Fire affected the six ozone monitors.94
To determine whether the Lake Fire affected the six monitors, the
court deferred to the EPA conclusions that organic carbon and elemental
carbon are relevant to the causation analysis as those compounds are
largely associated with biomass smoke emitted during wildfires.95 The
court concluded the EPA’s Wildfire Ozone Guidance permits using data
from “co-located or nearby” monitors, meaning the EPA’s use of Phoenix
Supersite Data was justified.96 This rationally connected the Lake Fire to
the six exceedances. The court failed to find fault with the EPA’s technical
conclusions with no contrary evidence or demonstration of analytical
error.97
Finally, the court looked at the demonstration that the Lake Fire
emissions caused the ozone exceedances.98 The ADEQ submitted three
matching day analyses comparing the June 20, 2015, exceedances to
previous readings based on: “(1) days with similar meteorological
conditions, (2) days which also recorded exceedances, and (3) days of the
week.”99 The EPA determined this evidence, along with other submitted
analyses, sufficiently demonstrated “a clear casual connection between
Lake Fire emissions and the exceedances.”100 Because the court found
Petitioners’ arguments undermined their own positions and failed to
contradict the EPA’s findings, it rule the EPA had not acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.101
C. The EPA Properly Interpreted Suspending SIP Attainment
Contingency Measures
In an issue of first impression, the court looked at whether the
CAA requires SIPs to contain attainment contingency measures where the
EPA determines a nonattainment area has attained the NAAQS by the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1076–77.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1077–78.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
Id.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id.
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attainment date.102 The court granted the agency Chevron deference after
concluding the CAA is silent regarding whether SIPs must contain such
measures.103 Where a statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue, Chevron
directs courts to defer to an agency interpretation so long as that
interpretation is reasonable.104 The court looked first at whether
administrative remedies were exhausted and then whether Chevron
deference supported the EPA’s construction of the CAA contingency
measures requirement
The EPA argued Petitioners forfeited their argument as their
comment did not assert that the EPA’s proposal to suspend the attainment
contingency measures requirement was unlawful under the CAA.105
Though Petitioners did comment, they did not address the agency’s
interpretation of the nonattainment plan provisions under 42 U.S.C §
7502(c)(9).106 The court noted that Petitioners, in their comment failed to
understand the EPA was not applying its Clean Data Policy, but rather
interpreting attainment contingency measures under the CAA.107
Therefore, the court held Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies because they failed to raise their issue with sufficient clarity to
the EPA.108
The court then considered, had administrative remedies been
exhausted, whether the CAA prevented the EPA from suspending the
attainment contingency measure requirements. The court found the EPA
was not prevented from suspending the requirements under the
circumstances.109 With the CAA silent on this matter, the court applied
Chevron deference and determined the EPA reasonably interpreted 42
U.S.C. § 75029(c)(9).110 The court determined the EPA’s decision to
suspend only attainment contingency measures was a narrow
interpretation and did not violate NAAQS.111 Further, the court found the
EPA’s interpretation was not a means for a state to avoid their
responsibilities under the CAA to meet NAAQS attainments.112
102.
Id. at 1082.
103.
Id. at 1085 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) which created the two-part legal test granting deference to
government agency’s when interpreting statutes for which that agency is tasked with
administering).
104.
Williams, supra note 26, at 792.
105.
Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1080.
106.
Id. at 1081 (42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(9) (2018) relates to contingency
measures requiring plans to “provide the implementation of specific measures to be
undertaken if the area fails to make reasonable further progress, or to attain the
national primary ambient air quality standard by the attainment date . . . .such plans
shall be included in the plan revision as contingency measures to take effect in any
such case without further action by the State or the Administrator”).
107.
Id. at 1081.
108.
Id. at 1082.
109.
Id.
110.
Id. at 1085.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
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Therefore, the EPA could suspend attainment contingency measure
requirements despite Phoenix’s previous failures to reach the necessary air
quality standards by the attainment date.
V. CASE ANALYSIS
The legal framing the court used is well-founded and within
precedent, however the framework itself neglects to consider the shift of
wildfire regimes and mechanisms to mitigate air quality concerns. The
EER’s inclusion of wildfires as an exceptional event fails to support the
purposes of the CAA. Exposure to smoke is one of the most pressing
public health concerns.113 Wildfire smoke inhalation is the cause of
numerous health problems and has been linked to early death, low infant
birth weight, and a series of severe respiratory problems for vulnerable
populations.114 With fire events increasing in severity and frequency, the
risks of smoke exposure are similarly increasing. This is largely due to the
history of the United States Forest Service’s (“USFS”) forest and wildfire
management across the West.
The USFS wildfire suppression strategy became the principal
management directive of the USFS after the 1910 fires swept across Idaho,
Montana, and Washington, devastating more than three million acres of
private and federal lands, and killing at least 85 people.115 The dominant
narrative post-1910 to suppress fires and the public threat of fire
influenced the legislative and executive for several generations of land
managers. More than 100 years of this fire suppression strategy led to
extensive fuel build-up and increased the likelihood of high-severity and
high-frequency fires. When wildfires are suppressed, opportunities to
create fuel breaks, reduce departure from natural fire regimes, and
decrease future extreme fire behavior are lost.116 Though fire seasons are
expected to worsen, there is no mechanism for accountability in air quality
consequences with wide-reaching threats to public health.117
A. The Exceptional Events Rule Fails to Support the Intent of the CAA
The EER does not support the purpose of the CAA. There are three
major areas of concern with the EPA’s engagement of air quality issues
relating to wildfire management and smoke emissions. These issues are:
(1) allowing states to petition to exclude NAAQS exceedances from
wildfire smoke emissions, (2) the inclusion of wildfire as an exceptional
event, and (3) EER classifying wildfires as “natural” rather than
113.
Williams, supra note 26, at 776.
114.
Id.
115.
The
1910
Fires,
FOREST
HISTORY
SOCIETY,
https://perma.cc/AX2M-Z6RD (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).
116.
Brett H. Davis, Carol Miller, & Sean A. Parks, Retrospective Fire
Modeling: Quantifying the Impacts of Fire Suppression, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE (Apr. 2010), at 1, https://perma.cc/PJ8Q-VD87.
117.
Hijazi, supra note 8.
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“anthropogenic” given the extensive history of fire suppressions role in
the current fire regime. At their root, each of these three issues can be
traced back to how the EPA and CAA think about fire and the language
used.
The EPA should cease granting state requests to exclude air
pollution readings attributable to wildfire. These requests are made when
determining the state’s compliance with NAAQS. By allowing states to
petition for excluding NAAQS exceedances, smoke management is
dictated by reactive wildfire management efforts that are unable to address
air pollution issues. Changes to air quality laws to incentivize proactive
management efforts should require NAAQS to include emissions from
large wildfires or limit the discretion of local air regulators to block
prescribed fire projects that look to mitigate wildfire risks and smoke
emissions.118
The EPA should exclude uncontrolled wildfires from the EER.119
Currently, the EPA interprets the EER to exempt wildfire events from
CAA compliance with air quality management. To incentivize prescribed
fires, wildfires need to be included in NAAQS compliance to encourage
local air management districts to use managed fires to reduce risks of
severe fires.120 In removing wildfire emission from the EER, smoke
management could implement proactive treatment strategies, such as
prescribed fire. Though failures in air standard compliance may still
threaten public health, proactive, rather than reactive management, would
reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfires. at the severity seen today.121
Another place for revision is abandoning the distinction between
“natural” and “anthropogenic” when considering wildfires and prescribed
fire events in regulation.122 Given the consequences of fire suppression
policy, unplanned wildfires as a “natural” phenomenon is a disingenuous
descriptor.123 Even outside the EPA’s EER, referring to unplanned
wildfires as “natural” post-suppression gives a public impression wildfire
smoke is less harmful to health and visibility than smoke from prescribed
fires.124 Importantly, the EPA’s treatment of wildfires as per se natural
events is inconsistent with the agency’s own definition which classifies a
wildfire as an unplanned ignition and includes the language “unauthorized
and accidental human caused fires”.125
The air quality threats resulting from wildfires should no longer
be deemed exceptional as it becomes the new normal.126 Satellite-based
118.
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estimates show a steady increase of “smokey days” across the United
States with smoke quickly becoming a regional air pollution issue.127 To
better address worsening air pollution issues from wildfire smoke
emissions, the EER will need to stop considering wildfires an exceptional
event. In Bahr, the court relied on the correct legal framework, however
an opportunity was missed in critiquing how these exceptions to air
pollution standards affect public health. The Ninth Circuit is comprised
largely of western states adversely and persistently affected by the smoke
emissions of worsening wildfire seasons. Neglecting to address how
excluding wildfire smoke emissions from NAAQS standards via the EER
shows a failure in understanding the heart of the CAA’s intent.
B. Cross-boundary Smoke Can Cause NAAQS Exceedances
Wildfires are a recurring, episodic source of air pollution with
intensifying threats to public health in the face of climate change.128
Smoke does not adhere to state boundaries, rather it travels at the behest
of weather patterns. Jet streams and cross-continental air currents can carry
smoke and ash thousands of miles, affecting people nowhere near the fire
itself with air contaminants.129 It is not uncommon for wildfires in different
states, or even from Canada, to adversely affect ambient air quality across
the continent. In 2021, wildfire smoke from Canada and Western United
States triggered unhealthy air quality levels across must of the East
Coast.130
The Bahr court recognized the agency’s technical expertise
supported the clear causal relationship between the Lake Fire in California
and the six exceedances 300 miles away in Phoenix, Arizona. Though this
is a meaningful requirement to exempt an event under the EER, it is
increasingly less relevant to addressing the real issues around wildfire and
air quality exceedance.
Dedicating resources and time to proving the relationship between
a particular fire and specific exceedances does little to address the issue of
air pollution from wildfire smoke emissions. Agencies have continuously
sought to better develop technical tools and mapping techniques to better
understand fire behavior and smoke emissions. This expertise is accessible
and well-understood across the scientific discipline. Rather than requiring
an agency to prove an exceedance has a clear causal relationship to a
wildfire, resources should be spent in proactive management that seeks to
avoid those exceedances in the first place. This will require administrative
guidance from the EPA and United States Forest Service that promotes
127.
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proactive treatments and management strategies across western forests.
These strategies may include treatments such as thinning or prescribed fire
to reduce hazardous fuels that will combust in aa wildfire event and emit
smoke, particularly around densely populated parts of the western U.S. By
treating fuel loads before a fire ignites, hazardous levels of smoke
emissions will be mitigated, and NAAQS exceedances will decrease in
frequency.
C. Chevron Deference is in Trouble
The court’s analysis of the question regarding the EPA’s
suspension of SIP attainment contingency measures was done primarily
through the standard set forth in Chevron. Though agencies often have
specialized expertise that is worth considering, Chevron deference is
becoming increasingly controversial.
In recent years, some justices on the current United States
Supreme Court have been critical of this established law. Justice Thomas
criticized Chevron in his concurrence in Michigan v. EPA,131 while
Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch have publicly criticized this doctrine
prior to their appointment to the Supreme Court.132 Despite this criticism,
the Supreme Court has so far declined to reexamine Chevron.133 With
Justice Barrett’s confirmation, there is some anticipation the Robert Court
may weaken, if not overturn, this agency deference.134 Circuit and district
courts continue to apply Chevron and would still likely apply to the CAA
even if it is limited in other ways as it is strongest when it is applied to a
direct agency delegation of “complicated and expert driven regulations.135
Looking forward, it is important to note Arizona statutorily
overturned Chevron deference with respect to most of the state’s agencies
with House Bill 2238 in 2018.136 Where state agencies interpretation or
expertise is in question in future cases, deference will no longer be given.
This requires the court, in reviewing a final administrative decision
“brought by or against a regulated party” to decide all legal questions
without deference and without “any previous determination by the
agency.”137 Though petitions for review like in Bahr go straight to a Court
of Appeals in the appropriate circuit, the court may still consider the state’s
choice to remove Chevron deference when considering a state agency’s
actions.
It is reasonable to expect Chevron deference may be weakened or
entirely unavailable for a court to rely on when considering an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. This will provide a different scope
of review for the courts to determine if an agency’s action was proper.
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Given the turmoil of the Trump Administration in appointing agency
administrators, the loss of Chevron may not be as bleak as it appears. The
EPA had two administrators over the course of four years, both of whom
broadly supported the fossil fuels industry, made careers attacking the
agency they would head, and public questions climate science.138
Decisions made under those administrators would still be subject to this
standard of review for actions that may disregard the CAA implicitly. The
swings in policy between administrations appointing the heads of agency
should be of concern when those agencies are given broad deference for
actions taken. However, Chevron allows agencies to focus on the scope of
their work with the knowledge that judicial review of agency action will
fall under this deference and that can be a benefit for agencies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Across the western United States, increased wildfire risk resulting
from historic fire suppression strategies and climate change calls for fire
management reform.139 The current legal framework to address issues of
wildfire smoke emissions on air quality is well-formed yet in need of
revision to better align the regulations with the purpose of the CAA. First
and foremost, the EER is reactive and limits proactive approaches to
wildfire and smoke management by disincentivizing prescribed fire while
misrepresenting the continuous negative impact of wildfires on ambient
air quality standards. By removing modern wildfires as an “exceptional
event,” more proactive approaches to mitigate conditions contributing to
offending smoke emissions are more realistic. Further, suspending SIPs
attainment measures is contrary to the CAA because it fails to support the
Act’s stated purpose of promoting public health and welfare through
protections and enhancements to the United States’ air resource.
This case was decided on the brink of administrative, scientific,
and management shifts, all of which are considering how symptoms of
climate change are impacting the frequency and severity of wildfires and
how that is growing to be a constant public health threat from smoke
emissions. Moving forward, more issues about the EPA’s Exceptional
Events Rule and NAAQS will need to be addressed by the courts.
However, it will unlikely be through the lens of retroactive presumption
and SIPs contingency measures. It is important to think about how these
regulations are not supportive of the CAA as they stand with wildfire
smoke emissions. Particularly, if Chevron deference is weakened or
becomes a more stringent test, the EPA may struggle to continue applying
these regulations on smoke emissions related to wildfires.
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